Tariff negotiations in Rubinstein bargaining model

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dc.contributor.authorYazıcı, Mehmet
dc.contributor.authorID144084tr_TR
dc.contributor.departmentÇankaya Üniversitesi, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, Uluslararası Ticaret Bölümütr_TR
dc.date.accessioned2024-04-25T07:38:45Z
dc.date.available2024-04-25T07:38:45Z
dc.date.issued2006-12
dc.description.abstractThis paper applies Rubinstein bargaining model to tariff negotiations in order to predict the outcome of the bargaining. Following Dixit (1987) and Mayer (1981), we are able to express tariff strategies in the form of reaction functions. This results in a strategy space much larger than that considered in the literature and also in a smooth welfare frontier. Having applied Rubinstein Bargaining model, we have characterized the outcome of the tariff negotiations and given an example, which indicates that the negotiations will lead to free trade when countries are symmetric.tr_TR
dc.identifier.citationYazıcı, Mehmet (2006). "Tariff negotiations in Rubinstein bargaining model", METU Studies in Development, Vol.33, No.2, pp.295-310.tr_TR
dc.identifier.endpage310tr_TR
dc.identifier.issn2980-0870
dc.identifier.issue2tr_TR
dc.identifier.startpage295tr_TR
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12416/7972
dc.identifier.volume33tr_TR
dc.language.isoengtr_TR
dc.relation.journalMETU Studies in Developmenttr_TR
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccesstr_TR
dc.titleTariff negotiations in Rubinstein bargaining modeltr_TR
dc.typearticletr_TR

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